Friday, December 30, 2011

The Afghan Question

The absence of a clear finish line continues to complicate any discussion of what to do about Afghanistan. Our justification for going in initially was based on a widely accepted tenet of international relations. If a government is unable to prevent its territory from being used as a base for attacking another country, that country is justified in going in to address the threat. Well address the threat we did, in typical badass American fashion. I watched it on TV and loved it. But since victory was never defined and an exit strategy was never articulated, we need to make several determinations before settling on the best course of action.

There is no question that we have managed some successes in the traditional military sense of driving back enemy forces and assuming control of contested territory.  And few would argue that those gains won’t be lost without American boots on the ground. But this isn’t a traditional military campaign. In WWII the allies drove the Germans out of France and forced their surrender by penetrating Germany itself. In the American Civil War Lincoln knew that by destroying Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia he would cripple the South’s ability to wage war and defend its bid for independence. Both cases resulted in the unconditional surrender of America’s enemy. But there will be no total victory in Afghanistan. In the absence of a clear end-game we need to answer the question- are the tactical gains we've made worth defending, and if so at what cost?

While I generally agree with following the advice of the commanders in the field over the whims of politicians, I limit that to after the decision has been made that there is a job to be done and the army is the right tool for that job. Because just like a carpenter is apt to see a solution to a dilapidated house involving hammers and nails, a general is apt to see a solution to a country in flux involving troops. Especially in the case of Afghanistan, where so much effort and so many lives have been invested in the victories we’ve won, our generals could be forgiven for having a hard time accepting that those victories may be pyrrhic.

Unfortunately that’s just what they are. While our initial retaliation to 9-11 was just and effective, the nation-building campaign that followed is doomed. The institution of democracy has been favorable for mankind but it doesn’t make a good export- particularly to the third world. Assistance from abroad can aid the process (France’s role in the American Revolution and NATO’s role in the Libyan conflict are instructive) but the revolution must be internal in origin if the new democracy is to sustain itself. It makes sense in the same way that a man who earns a fortune is more likely to retain it than a man who inherits one. Totalitarianism in the Arab world has concerned the west for decades. But it took the uprisings in Tunisia in late 2010 to inaugurate the chain reaction of civil disobedience that has toppled regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya, and triggered significant fundamental changes in several other countries. These populations are earning their democracies. The Afghans have earned nothing. The west has tried valiantly to hand it to them, but until they earn it themselves they will never keep it.

This hasn’t come as a surprise to anyone with a discerning eye on history and current events. Historians, philosophers and political scientists have long explored the link between the development of democracy and factors such as wealth, education and the accessibility of information. In the case of the Arab Spring experts have also been quick to note the contributions of social media to the spread of the movement. Take a close look at Tunisia, where the first uprisings began. 33% of the population has access to the internet and 85% have a cell phone. One in six even has a Facebook page- not as shocking when you consider that the median age is now 24. 57% of Tunisians enter the workforce with a college degree, though high unemployment persists and is blamed largely on the government. The people of Tunisia are young, educated and socially connected. And they’re pissed off. They were ready to rock. Now turn to Afghanistan. Afghanistan has one tenth the per capita GDP of Tunisia ($900), and one tenth the internet access (3.4%). They were not ready to rock.

Unfortunately no amount of territory seized by our armed forces and their allies can change that right now. Regardless of our intentions, nation-building is a fruitless enterprise if the domestic ingredients aren't in place and the populous isn’t ripe for revolt.  The good news is that unlike the days of Voltaire and Paine, the messages of the modern heroes of democracy can spread across the Arab world quickly. But for America, as much as I hate to say it given the friends of mine who have served over there, the right move is to withdraw from Afghanistan, and quickly. Our focus should be on the safety of our troops and the local population, and only secondarily on the strategic interests of the Afghan security forces. The Afghans will have democracy when they are ready to take it.

Sunday, December 4, 2011

College Football Quick Fix: No Rematch

There are layers and layers of conversation to be had about the state of college football. But let’s start with one easy fix- no conference rematches in the title game.

There is a quick, clean, two-step explanation for voting for the LSU-Alabama rematch. Step one, LSU is the most decisive number one in recent memory. In addition to going through multiple top-five and -ten competition to win their conference, they took out the champs of two other BCS conferences. Step two, after four quarter of football both the scoreboard and the eye test told us that Alabama and LSU were essentially equals. LSU needed four missed field goals by the Bama soccer players to survive. From that perspective it’s pretty straight-forward: if LSU is a decisive number one, Alabama must be an equally decisive number two. That rationale was satisfactory for a lot of voters.

And sure, Alabama may very well be the 2nd best team in the country. For that matter Arkansas may be the 3rd best team, and Georgia may be the 4th best team, and South Carolina may be the 5th best team. Who knows? More relevant, who cares? When it comes to picking a title game, I don't, at all.

This brings to my mind the original Ultimate Fighting Championship. The purpose of that first tournament was to put representatives of the world’s great fighting styles in a cage and see which champion, and which style, was supreme. Chances were that if the Olympic gold medalist in Greco-Roman wrestling could beat the Thai kick-boxing champ, then the silver and bronze medalists could too. But a rematch of the Greco gold medal match sure as hell didn’t headline that first pay-per-view. We already get to see wrestlers compete with wrestlers and boxers compete with boxers on a regular basis. The essence of the UFC is inter-sport competition. Like the kick-boxer to the Olympic wrestling champion, Oklahoma State offers to LSU the compelling contrast in style that made bowl games so appealing in the first place.

Arguments can be made that the traditional conference system has outlived its usefulness. But for all its faults this system provides a landscape of arguments unique to college sports. Is grimy SEC football superior to the spread offenses of the mid-west? How will the physical Big East style translate to tournament basketball with unfamiliar refs? Are the women’s power forwards of the Big Ten more butch than those of the Big Twelve? If we’re going to have these arguments then let’s get some resolution,otherwise what’s the point?